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Abstract
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a
limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority;
such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this
kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it
must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the
reservations.
Disciplines
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration | Social and Behavioral Sciences
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/277
The complete independence of the courts
of justice is peculiarly essential in a lim-
ited Constitution. By a limited Constitu-
tion, I understand one which contains 
certain speci½ed exceptions to the legis-
lative authority; such, for instance, as 
that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no 
ex post facto laws, and the like. Limita-
tions of this kind can be preserved in 
practice no other way than through the
medium of courts of justice, whose duty 
it must be to declare all acts contrary to
the manifest tenor of the Constitution
void. Without this, all the reservations 
of particular rights or privileges would
amount to nothing.
–Alexander Hamilton, The Federal-
ist No. 78
The judicial branch enjoys higher levels
of public trust than the other branches
of the U.S. government. “[The Supreme]
Court is an especially well regarded in-
stitution, and over and over again, polls
show that Americans have more con½-
dence in the Court than either the presi-
dent or the Congress,” write political
scientists Gregory A. Caldeira and Kevin
T. McGuire. “In evaluating the Court’s
authority, most Americans think that it
is exercising about the right amount of
political power, and more often than not
they believe that the Court is doing a
good job.”1 Consistent with this notion,
an August 2007 survey by the Annenberg
Public Policy Center of the University of
Pennsylvania2 found that 66 percent of
Americans trust the Supreme Court a
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1  Gregory A. Caldeira and Kevin T. McGuire,
“What Americans Know About The Courts and
Why It Matters,” in The Judicial Branch, ed. Ker-
mit L. Hall and Kevin T. McGuire (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 264.
2  The 2007 Annenberg Public Policy Center Ju-
dicial Survey was prepared by Princeton Survey
Research Associates International for the An-
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“great deal” or “fair amount” to operate
in the best interests of the American
people. Sixty percent of Americans trust
the courts in their own state a “great
deal” or “fair amount,” while only 41
percent of Americans polled trust the
president a “great deal” or “fair amount”
to operate in the best interests of the
American people–the same level of con-
½dence that Americans have in Congress
(41 percent). 
However, lurking in the data from the
same survey are two factors with the ca-
pacity to undermine con½dence in the
judiciary and, with it, public willingness
to protect the prerogatives of judges and
the courts. Ignorance about the role and
function of judges and the courts and
partisan campaigning for judicial of½ce
each independently threaten public 
trust in the judiciary. As trust declines,
willingness to constrain the judiciary
rises. 
A ½rst predictor of diminished trust 
in courts is ignorance about the judicia-
ry. In August 2007, one out of three (32
percent) in a national random sample 
of the adult population of the United
States believes U.S. Supreme Court rul-
ings can be appealed, and under a third
(31 percent) knows that the rulings are
½nal. Fewer than one in two (45 percent)
believes that a 5–4 decision by the Su-
preme Court produces the same out-
come as a 9–0 ruling. When the Court
divides so closely, 14 percent believes 
the decision is referred to Congress for
reconsideration, 7 percent thinks it is
sent back to the federal court of appeals,
and a third (34 percent) doesn’t know.
Forty percent thinks the Constitution
permits the president to ignore a Su-
preme Court ruling if he believes that
doing so will protect the country from
harm. A little less than half of Ameri-
cans (48 percent) knows Supreme Court
justices usually give written reasons be-
hind their rulings, 9 percent said justices
did not give written rulings, and 44 per-
cent did not know. In 2007, only 15 per-
cent of Americans could correctly name
John Roberts as chief justice of the Unit-
ed States. The survey did ½nd that a ma-
jority of Americans knew something
about some judges: two-thirds of Ameri-
cans (66 percent) could name at least
one of the judges on the Fox television
show American Idol. 
With ignorance about the judiciary
comes an increased disposition to be-
lieve that judges are biased and a re-
duced tendency to hold that the courts
act in the public interest. Those who
adopt these views are more willing to
allow Congress or state legislatures to
impeach judges who make unpopular
rulings; they are more likely to believe
that when Congress disagrees with the
Supreme Court’s decisions, Congress
should pass legislation saying the Su-
preme Court can no longer rule on that
issue or topic; and they are more like-
ly to believe that if the Supreme Court
“started making a lot of rulings that
most Americans disagreed with it might
be better to do away with the Court al-
together.” This ½nding is consistent 
with a conclusion drawn by Jamieson
and Michael Hennessy from the 2006
Annenberg Judicial Survey. Using struc-
tural equation modeling, they found: 
[I]ncreases in respondents’ knowledge
decrease[d] their belief that judges are
motivated by self-interest, that they fa-
nenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands. A
total of 1,514 adults 18 and older were surveyed
by phone from August 8, 2007, to September
2, 2007. The survey has a margin of error = 
± 3% for results based on full sample. Addi-
tional data from this and other surveys can be
found at www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter
.org.
vor the more affluent members of soci-
ety, that courts have too much power, and
that judges are too affected by the politi-
cal process. These four types of perceived
judicial bias–self-interest, economic bias,
power imbalance, political influence– . . .
are all negatively associated with trust in
courts. . . . [A] drop in trust and an increase
in the four judicial biases predict the be-
liefs that the president can ignore Supreme
Court decisions and that judges should be im-
peached on the basis of unpopular rulings.3
A second factor predicting reduced
trust and willingness to circumscribe
judicial prerogatives is living in a state
that elects judges through a partisan
process.4 By one estimate, 89 percent 
of state judges are selected by some 
form of election.5 In some of these in-
stances, judicial campaigns have become
high-stakes contests, bringing in large
sums of money and attack-driven adver-
tising campaigns. In 2006, a record $16
million was spent on advertising in state
supreme court races in ten states.6 Pro-
fessor Anthony Champagne’s study of
judicial advertisements found that ads
commonly attacked opponents, portray-
ing them as “corrupted by campaign
contributions, the tools of special in-
terests, and soft on crime.”7
In recent years, the number of judi-
cial candidates airing attack ads has
increased. “In Alabama, Georgia, and
Nevada candidates hurled insults and
accusations that would have been un-
becoming even in congressional cam-
paigns, much less in campaigns by indi-
viduals whose judicial temperament is
an important quali½cation for of½ce.”8
A report by Justice at Stake found that 
in 2004 nine out of ten negative judicial
ads were sponsored by political parties
and special interest groups. By 2006 the
candidates were sponsoring 60 percent
of negative advertisements.9
While the level of attack could be a
cause for concern in its own right, the
existence of serious distortions in these
ads is troubling as well. In a 2006 report
by the Annenberg Public Policy Center’s
FactCheck.org, Deputy Director Viveca
Novak provided illustrations of such dis-
tortions: 
Dædalus  Fall 2008 13
Will igno-
rance &
partisan
election 
of judges
undermine
public trust
in the judi-
ciary? 
3  Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Michael Hen-
nessy, “Public Understanding of and Support
for the Courts: Survey Results,” The Georgetown
Law Journal 95 (2007): 902; original emphases.
4  Sixteen states elect at least some judges in an
environment in which there are strong partisan
cues, including, in some states, party identi½ca-
tion on the ballot. They are Alabama, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland*, Michi-
gan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina**, Ohio***, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, and West Virginia.
*Maryland trial judges run in contestable non-
partisan general elections but are nominated in
party primaries. A candidate in Maryland can
cross-½le in both the Democratic and Republi-
can primaries.
**Although North Carolina moved away from
an explicitly partisan ballot in 2002 some parti-
san campaigning has continued.
***In Ohio, candidates appear on the ballot
without party af½liation, but their selection 
and campaigns are otherwise partisan.
5  Roy A. Schotland, “New Challenges to States’
Judicial Selection,” The Georgetown Law Journal
95 (2007): 1092.
6  James Sample, Lauren Jones, and Rachel
Weiss, The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2006
(Washington, D.C.: Justice at Stake, 2007);
www.justiceatstake.org.
7  Anthony Champagne, “Television Ads in
Judicial Campaigns,” Indiana Law Review 35
(2001–2002): 670.
8  Sample, Jones, and Weiss, The New Poli-
tics of Judicial Elections 2006, 8.
9  Ibid.
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One ad, for example, falsely implied that 
a candidate for the Kentucky Supreme
Court paroled a rapist who 12 hours la-
ter raped a 14-year-old and forced her
mother to watch. Another portrayed a
Georgia candidate as soft on crime, even
though independent reviews found that
she usually sided with the prosecutor and
was tough on defendants in death penal-
ty cases. And a third invited viewers to 
believe, wrongly, that an Alabama candi-
date got nearly $1 million from oil compa-
nies to run negative ads against his oppo-
nent.10
The public ½nds some of the practices
associated with judicial elections worri-
some. Even though a solid majority (64
percent) endorses judicial election, the
2007 Annenberg survey found that 69
percent thinks that raising money for
campaigns affects a judge’s rulings to a
moderate or great extent. These results
mirror what Charles Gardner Geyh, pro-
fessor of law and director of the Ameri-
can Judicature Society’s Center for Judi-
cial Independence, calls the Axioms of 80:
Eighty percent of the public favors elect-
ing their judges; eighty percent of the
electorate does not vote in judicial races;
eighty percent is unable to identify the
candidates for judicial of½ce; and eighty
percent believes that when judges are
elected, they are subject to influence 
from the campaign contributors who
made the judges’ election possible.11
The Annenberg survey also revealed
that the public does not clearly distin-
guish the role of judge from that of leg-
islator. Seventy-seven percent holds
that, to a great or moderate extent, state
judges should represent the views of 
the people of their state. Ninety-four
percent believes that this is a responsi-
bility of the state legislators. Three-
fourths (75 percent) reports that repre-
senting the views of the people of their
state applies to both state judges and
state legislators. When asked whose job
it is to interpret the laws of the state and
the state constitution, 91 percent said
state judges, while 87 percent reported
that, to a great or moderate extent, it is
the state legislators’ responsibility. Fifty-
six percent of Americans believe that
expressing their views on controversial
issues is a responsibility that applies to
judges, while 75 percent see this as a re-
sponsibility of state legislators. 
Multivariate statistical analyses of the
2007 Annenberg survey show that Amer-
icans who live in states that hold parti-
san judicial elections are more distrust-
ing of the courts than Americans who
live in states that do not hold such elec-
tions.12 Speci½cally, after controlling for
gender, age, race, education, political
party identi½cation, and news media
use, living in a state that holds partisan
elections13 is negatively related to trust-
ing the courts in that state to operate in
the best interest of the American people.
Participants living in a state that holds
partisan elections are also more likely to
believe that courts “legislate from the10  Viveca Novak, “Judicial Campaigns: Begin-
ning to Look a Lot Like Congress: Would-be
judges employ big bucks, tv ads and question-
able attacks,” November 20, 2006; available at
http://www.factcheck.org/judicial-campaigns
/judicial_campaigns_beginning_to_look_a_lot
.html.
11  Charles Gardner Geyh, “Why Judicial 
Elections Stink,” The Ohio State Law Jour-
nal 64 (2003): 47–79.
12  For a detailed description of the multivari-
ate analyses, see the Annenberg Public Policy
Center report “Partisan Judicial Elections Fos-
ter Cynicism and Distrust”; available at http://
www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/News
Details.aspx?myId=241.
13  See Geyh, “Why Judicial Elections Stink.”
bench” and less likely to believe that the
courts are “fair and impartial” in their
rulings and “interpret the law.” Finally,
those living in a state that holds partisan
elections were more likely to agree that
“judges are just politicians in robes.” All
of these results are statistically signi½-
cant and hold in the presence of control
variables. Taken together they suggest
that partisan judicial elections have the
capacity to erode public trust in the judi-
cial branch. 
This erosion of trust is signi½cantly re-
lated to support for punitive policy deci-
sions. Controlling for gender, age, race,
education, news media use, and knowl-
edge about the courts, analyses of the
2007 Annenberg survey show that a lack
of trust in the courts is signi½cantly re-
lated to willingness to: (1) allow Con-
gress or state legislatures to impeach
judges; (2) afford Congress the ability 
to pass legislation saying the Supreme
Court can no longer rule on an issue or
topic if Congress disagrees with the
Court’s rulings; and (3) believe that it
might be better to do away with the Su-
preme Court altogether if it “started
making a lot of unpopular rulings.” 
Responding to concerns such as these,
retired associate justice of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, Sandra Day O’Connor, re-
commends14 that states do away with
judicial elections and adopt a merit-
selection process in which an indepen-
dent committee of citizens recommends
quali½ed candidates for appointment by
the governor. States that currently elect
judges are unlikely to forgo that practice,
however. The August 2007 Annenberg
survey found nearly two-thirds (64 per-
cent) favor the direct election of judges,
while a merit-selection process is fa-
vored by less than one-third (31 per-
cent). 
Justice O’Connor’s second suggestion
focuses on implementing civic education
programs about the judiciary, a recom-
mendation consistent with our ½ndings
that knowledge about the courts increas-
es trust in this branch of government.
Analyses of the 2007 survey suggest that
civic education can increase knowledge
about the courts. Fifty-three percent of
those surveyed reported taking a class 
in civics or a course that focused on the
U.S. Constitution or the judicial system.
Controlling for gender, age, race, educa-
tion, and news media use, these individ-
uals were signi½cantly more knowledge-
able about the courts than those who
had never taken such a class. As our
analysis predicts, increased knowledge
predicted increased trust in the judi-
ciary. And, as outlined above, with in-
creased trust comes a heightened dispo-
sition to protect judges from impeach-
ment for unpopular rulings and the judi-
ciary from stripped jurisdiction. Trust
also increased the belief that the Su-
preme Court should be retained in the
face of unpopular rulings.
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14  Sandra Day O’Connor, “Justice for Sale,”
Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2007.
